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The impact of universalistic versus particularistic criteria on academic hiring has been receiving growing attention
in recent years. Yet, most studies conducted on hiring norms in academy and management academy have ignored
the impact of social capital, particularly structural social capital, a particularistic attribute, on occupational
outcomes. This could lead to a partial if not misleading view of the sociology of hiring in management academy.
We utilize a novel approach, focusing on academic departments’ structural social capital in the form of network
centrality (based on cumulative PhD exchange networks), and explore how this type of centrality impacts job
seekers’ occupational prestige for new academic jobs in management departments and early career quality
publications. We ﬁnd that although merit-based criteria such as publications matter somewhat, academic network
centrality explains signiﬁcant variance in obtaining prestigious jobs. Paradoxically, we ﬁnd that academic
network centrality does not explain early career publications. We discuss the implications of our ﬁndings for
management science. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Keywords: universalism; particularism; hiring; network centrality

Introduction
What do academic institutions look for when hiring new faculty? Although one can argue that job seekers’ merit such as
their publications and nonpersonal factors such as the prestige of their graduate programs matter, the relative impact of
these criteria is unclear and continues to be the focus of academic labor market research (Burris, 2004; Turner, 1960).
More recently, management scholars have also begun to explore the normative dynamics of academic hiring, as a part
of larger interest in the sociology of hiring (Glick, Miller, & Cardinal, 2008a, 2008b). A central issue for this research
revolves around the impact of universalistic hiring norms versus particularistic hiring norms on access to academic
careers (Long & Fox, 1995). For example, Cable and Murray (1999) note that universalistic or merit-based criteria such
as publications are key to obtaining a prestigious academic job. On the other hand, other academic labor market scholars
(Bedeian, Cavazos, Hunt, & Jauch, 2010; Miller, Glick, & Cardinal, 2005) observe that job candidates are often preselected by members of professional elites primarily on the basis of non-merit criteria, such as departmental prestige
(D’Aveni, 1996). Indeed, scholarship has consistently indicated that the academic prestige of one’s PhD department
(a particularistic variable) in management academia matters for obtaining initial prestigious jobs (Judge, KammeyerMueller, & Bretz, 2004). Given that management science represents a developing, but not yet mature, paradigm (Glick
*Correspondence to: Michael Hadani, Management, Long Island University, 720 Northern Blvd., Brookville, New York 11548, U.S.A. E-mail:
michael.hadani@liu.edu

Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Received 14 September 2010
Revised 29 September 2011, Accepted 3 October 2011

724

M. HADANI ET AL.

et al., 2008a; Pfeffer, 1993), relying on a particularistic criterion is not surprising.1 Graduating from a prestigious PhD
program should provide students with better human capital, that is, an individual’s skills, reputation, experience
knowledge (Coleman, 1988; Haynes & Hillman, 2010), and social capital—that is, actual and potential resources that
are available to an individual because of a network of relationships he or she possess or by an afﬁliation he or she
has (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998), which should improve one’s future scholarship, especially in the early years (Bedeian
et al., 2010; Miller et al., 2005).
However, we argue that this consistent reliance on the prestige of one’s PhD department as a selection criterion can only
provide a partial picture of hiring norms in management; therefore, studies need to focus on other factors that actually
impact such hiring procedures. Here, we posit that an important factor in the hiring process is the academic network
centrality (ANC) of the PhD-granting department. ANC can be deﬁned as the network location of departments based
on their reciprocal PhD hiring and placing history. We argue that this type of network centrality provides us with a new
and distinct measure of identifying structural social capital and its possible instrumental beneﬁts (such as unique access
to information) that should impact occupational outcomes, such as obtaining a prestigious job, because it captures a
fundamental and underlying process of creating status distinctions in different arenas (Bourdieu, 1986).
Academic prestige of a department is the collective scholarly accomplishments of the faculty and the graduate students (Burris, 2004). Yet, the way studies have focused on academic prestige is questionable because of several reasons.
First, PhD academic prestige may not be predictive of one’s future scholarship such as high-quality post-graduation
publications. Long, Bowers, Barnett, and White (1998) found that in management, the prestige of one’s PhD-granting
department did not predict the number of high-quality post-graduation publications. Second, different viewpoints
regarding prestige exist (D’Aveni, 1996), reﬂecting the subjective interpretation of different constituencies (Bedeian,
2002). Thus, prestige maybe more “noisy” than scholarship assumes; it may not be sufﬁcient to understand the normative dynamics impacting occupational outcomes. In fact, by focusing on ANC, we can examine how social structure and
positioning of academic departments in management may provide additional explanations for both occupational outcomes and performance outcomes in management, for new job seekers. Speciﬁcally, Burris (2004) has argued that
the prestige of an academic department is one that is produced and sustained over time through the cumulative placing
and hiring of PhD students. He shows that in the ﬁeld of sociology, about 84 per cent of the concurrent variance of
departmental academic prestige can be attributed to such exchanges as they convey relational wealth to their members.
Given the impact of network centrality on academic prestige in other disciplines, these exchanges may be more
important than scholarship acknowledges also in predicting the academic placement prestige of new graduates. Hence,
in this study, we explore how the ANC of PhD-granting departments in management impacts entry into prestigious
initial academic jobs, above and beyond traditional measures of prestige. Ignoring the impact of network centrality as
a social resource not only will provide a highly partial depiction of labor norms and occupational outcomes (i.e.,
Podolny & Baron, 1997) but will also ignore how the dynamics of structural social capital speciﬁcally ANC (based
on regulated personnel exchanges) impact career outcomes. Although our paper explores the inﬂuence of ANC on occupational prestige similar to that of Burris (2004), our work is unique in several ways. First, Burris was concerned about
predicting the general impact of the ANC of a department on its own prestige, whereas we aim to establish the
association between the ANC of a department and new academic job prestige. Second, we go beyond Burris (2004)
to explore how ANC may impact early career scholarship in the form of high-quality publications. The latter issue is
important, because we know centrality strongly impacts prestige hierarchies in other academic ﬁelds. However, it is unclear if such an effect is based on the ability of job seekers from centrally located academic units to instrumentally use
their position to achieve better scholarship (in the form of future publications). In other words, we wish to ﬁnd out if the
supposed impact of network centrality on occupational outcomes is justiﬁed from a scholarship viewpoint. Third, we
study the relationship between ANC and prestige in the context of management departments in the U.S.—a dynamic
As reviewed by Long and Fox (1995), studies show that in scientiﬁc ﬁelds characterized by weaker paradigms, performance-based criteria such
as publications explain less variance in career outcomes compared with particularistic variables (see also Hargens & Hagstrom, 1982; Zuckerman,
1988). Weak paradigm development is further characterized by higher levels of uncertainty regarding what constitutes scientiﬁc contributions and
which theoretical contributions are meaningful (Glick et al., 2008a). As such, reliance on publications compared with other attributes may be less
likely.

1
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that has not been explored before.2 We investigate these questions by analyzing the ANC of over 100 PhD-granting
departments in management academia and by exploring its impact on the career placement and future scholarship of
602 new PhD graduates, who received their degrees from these departments between 2005 and 2007.

Academic Career Mobility: Empirical Findings
What are the factors that impact job seekers’ chances of obtaining an academic job? Academic labor market scholarship
recognizes the impact of two distinct hiring criteria categories: universalistic and particularistic. Universalism refers to
merit-based contributions to science as the main criterion for career mobility, regardless of a person’s afﬁliation or
individual characteristics (Cole & Cole, 1973); whereas particularism, or sponsored-based labor mobility (Turner,
1960), focuses on personal considerations unrelated to scientiﬁc contributions that nonetheless impact placement (Long,
Allison, & McGinnis, 1979). Such considerations can reﬂect personal, social, or otherwise ascriptive attributes of
individuals such as prestige (Long & Fox, 1995). In addressing the question which norm is more prominent in academia
(and particularly in management academia), we reviewed the academic literature spanning the last 42 years (1969–2011)
to examine studies carried out on occupational placement and its prestige, of which we found 25. Overall, these studies
indicate that particularistic variables consistently matter for occupational outcomes. First, the prestige of job seekers’
doctoral-granting departments or institutions is a major predictor of getting a job and the prestige of that job (20 of
25 studies report a signiﬁcant effect for this variable; e.g., Allison & Long, 1987; Barbezat, 1992; Bedeian et al.,
2010). Second, PhD dissertation chairperson eminence matters across different disciplinary areas of science, such as
management, economics, and chemistry (e.g., Judge et al., 2004). Third, of the 19 studies that included publications
as an independent variable, only nine found a signiﬁcant effect for this variable on occupational outcomes (e.g., Allison
& Scott, 1987), whereas ﬁve found mixed results (e.g., Miller et al., 2005), and ﬁve found no effect of publications on
their career-related dependent variables (e.g., Hurlbert & Rosenfeld, 1992). Fourth, whereas some studies discussed social capital, only one study of the 25 explicitly explored the impact of ANC on career outcomes such as being able to
enter better jobs and having access to resources not available to others (Burris, 2004). In summary, it appears that particularistic variables loom larger in academic labor markets compared with universalistic ones. The six studies that exclusively focused on management graduates indicated that prestige matters for PhD graduates in most cases (Bedeian
et al.; D’Aveni, 1996; Miller et al.), but not all (cf. Cable & Murray, 1999). Hence, although Burris’ (2004) work shows
us the importance of ANC as a variable when it comes to understanding academic prestige, no study (to our knowledge)
has explicitly examined how network centrality with its social capital-related implications impacts occupational
outcomes.

Network Centrality: Social Capital Implications
Although deﬁnitions vary, traditional sociology scholarship views social capital as a structural function of social networks
and positions within them, which translate into relational resources and possible instrumental outcomes (Adler & Kwon,
2002; Burt, 1992; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). One important structural aspect is network centrality, which refers to the
structural position or location of individuals, groups, departments, or organizations, within a larger institutional network
of ties connecting them to each other (Ibarra & Andrews, 1993). Theoretically, centrally located units, actors, or actors
2

Burris (2004) examined the relationship between prestige and ANC in sociology, whereas our focus is on management. Although there can be
some overlap between the two disciplines, they are distinct in their core theoretical assumptions, in their administrative setting within universities,
and in their paradigmatic development, as management science draws on a variety of theoretical sources distinct from sociology and is also a
newer discipline.
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embedded in these units have access to resources others lack (Hardy et al., 2003), such resources that represent social or
relational wealth (Brass, 1992; Burt, 2001).
Speciﬁcally, social network scholarship has utilized resource dependence theory (RDT) to explain some of the instrumental outcomes associated with network centrality (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). RDT argues that by virtue of their
structural position among other units, and speciﬁcally based on the existence of stable social ties among the units,
centrally located organizations beneﬁt from access to valued resources and information. These, in turn, increase
not only the focal unit’s chances of obtaining information faster but also the likelihood of controlling the ﬂow of
information to other units it is connected to (Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996). Such positions also result in
higher institutional or unit visibility (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Moreover, RDT argues that being centrally located
may leverage dependencies on other units in the network, given the ﬂow of resources to the centrally located organization (Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve, & Tsai, 2004). Empirically, studies have supported the leverage and power
implications of network centrality for social units or individuals therein; studies have shown how access to information,
knowledge, and control over such resources are impacted by a unit’s structural position in a network (Brass & Burkhardt,
1993; Brass et al., 2004). Others have shown, in a variety of contexts that network centrality not only increases access to
different resources but may also increase legitimacy, or perceived social status (i.e., Baldwin, Bedell, & Johnson, 1997;
Mehra, Kilduff, & Brass, 2001; Settoon & Mossholder, 2002; Reagans & Zuckerman, 2001).
The notion that network centrality translates into higher social status is based on Bourdieu’s (1986) work, arguing that a
social unit’s position within its ﬁeld impacts the resources and power the unit has. Speciﬁcally, Bourdieu argues that these
networks and the exchanges that are conducted therein become the marker of an individual or organization’s social capital,
which is akin to being a member of an exclusive group or social unit. He also explains that it is these exchanges between
members of groups that create and sustain the network and re-produce their social capital over time. The social ties created
via such reciprocal exchanges are often stable and produce a highly regulated or circumscribed social boundary, whose
exclusivity signals higher social status to its members and to outsiders (Bourdieu, 1986) as well as increase members’ visibility. Hence, he highlights two related beneﬁts associated with the position of units in their network—regulated
exchanges that signal uniqueness and exclusivity and the existence of enduring social ties—serving as conduits of resource
transfer, such as information and communication. In this way, social capital of units becomes a key strategic resource.
Burris (2004) extends this argument to show how this social capital within academic departments is produced out of the
continuous processes of mutual hiring and placement of PhD students. These exchanges, in turn, produce and sustain
close-knit ties between departments, creating an exclusive group that becomes part of the foundation for the academic
prestige of these departments. In fact, he ﬁnds that PhD exchange network centrality is strongly predictive of traditional
measures of academic prestige, a dynamic that supports the view that ANC provides a behavioral and objective basis
for prestige. Hence, Bourdieu’s thesis regarding regulated social exchanges serves as the foundation for understanding
ANC and consequently its instrumental outcomes. Combining the ﬁndings of the network studies and RDT, we argue that
the ANC of a department becomes a key resource that helps in hiring and placing PhD students in high-prestige
departments. We build on this notion and focus on the informational advantages and visibility associated with this type
of social capital.

Network Centrality: Academic Career Outcomes
Network centrality and its associated social capital impact individual job seekers through the membership beneﬁts
bestowed by an exchange-regulated social system—providing beneﬁts to its members—including information, access
to resources, and visibility (Ibarra, 1993). On the basis of the dependency dynamics posited by RDT, centrally located
departments control or accrue valuable resources because of their relative structural position and associated reciprocal
ties that allow them to stand out in their institutional network (Swaminathan & Moorman, 2009). For instance, studies
have shown centrally located social units, such as departments within organizations or organizations within their ﬁeld,
receive more information and can control information ﬂow to other connected units, by virtue of their central location
Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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and their legitimacy (Hardy, Phillips, & Lawrence, 2003; Inkpen & Tsang, 2005). In the context of hiring, being at a
nexus of information ﬂows and having faster access to premium information can improve job seekers’ occupational outcomes, an effect consistently documented for the general labor market (Brown, 1967; Burt, 1992; Hezlett & Gibson,
2007). Following these studies, we believe that in the context of academic labor markets, graduates from centrally
located departments should also have an information premium above other job seekers, given the established reciprocal
ties associated with PhD exchanges and the communication ﬂow transmitted via such ties.
Moreover, from the perspective of hiring institutions, ANC may represent a powerful decision-making heuristic that
can reduce labor market search costs, particularly in management academia. This can prove valuable because, when
decisions are made under conditions of uncertainty or limited information, individuals are more likely to rely on simpliﬁed decision rules or heuristics that provide cognitive shortcuts (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Teversky &
Kahneman, 1973). Of several heuristics suggested by scholars, we argue that reliance on network centrality reﬂects
the heuristic of availability used to estimate the saliency or memorability with which associations or instances come
to mind (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). For example, when people make judgments about the success or failure of a
particular business strategy, business leaders often rely on their knowledge about the probability of success from their
experiences. This heuristic reﬂects the ease with which people predict the frequency of events or the proportion of a category within a population (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The ease of recall of more vivid or visible associations is representative of this heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). The impact of this heuristic on
decision makers in a variety of settings has been widely supported (Hayibor & Wasieleski, 2009; McKelvie, 1997;
O’Guinn & Shrum, 1997).
Although decision makers assessing job seekers’ credentials are not faced with a typical probabilistic assessment of event frequency probability, they still need to assess an unknown quantity—the scholarship and skills
of potential new faculty, and that involves signiﬁcant uncertainty (Judge et al., 2007). This is more signiﬁcant
in disciplines such as management, (Pfeffer, 1993; Van Maanen, 1995) which has a weaker paradigm (Glick
et al., 2008a, 2008b). As noted before, network centrality of social units induces a certain level of visibility
and legitimacy (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). Further, ANC also reﬂects the uniqueness or the exclusivity of
a department or a unit (i.e., Bourdieu, 1986), thereby increasing its visibility. Such a dynamic is more likely to
set PhDs of high ANC departments apart from other job seekers, as implied by the heuristic of availability that
views visibility or salience as increasing the ease of recall of an event or an item and that increases the decision
makers’ perceived familiarity with the object under scrutiny (Kahneman & Tversky, 1974). Thus, given that
centrally located departments are more visible in their ﬁeld (as implied by RDT), by association, graduates of
these departments are likely to be perceived as more salient or more memorable in the minds of decision makers.
Hence, graduates are likely to be given more attention compared with other job seekers, which can help them
crowd out other job seekers.3 Similar trends can be seen in the hiring patterns in S&P 500 ﬁrms (Williamson &
Cable, 2003a), where the board tends to rely on their established network ties when hiring for top management
positions. In this way, we believe that under conditions of uncertainty, network centrality can act as a signaling
mechanism that reduces uncertainty associated with differentiating between many job seekers with potential but
no history to rely on—a situation common for prestigious jobs at academic institutions. Finally, departments
that have high prestige may also want to maintain or enhance their positions. If departments recognize how
reciprocal hiring between high-prestige departments helps develop stronger ties with other prestigious
departments—subsequently helping maintain their prestige (Burris, 2004)—they are more likely to look into their
networks to hire.
Thus, we propose,
Hypothesis 1: PhDs graduating from more centrally located departments are positively associated with obtaining
an academic job with higher departmental prestige.
3

Given decision makers’ limited time and oftentimes many job seekers competing for few or a single position receiving more attention can prove
beneﬁcial.
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Network Centrality: Academic Scholarship Outcomes
Although it is important to explore the impact of network centrality on the ability to get prestigious jobs, the question
remains as to whether ANC also translates into better academic outcomes—such as scholarship. In the context of academic
life, the relevant literature views high-quality publications as a central measure of successful academic outcomes (Bedeian
et al., 2010). Indeed, the positive relationship between network centrality and academic prestige, measured by the National
Research Council’s prestige rankings (Burris, 2004), raises the possibility that the relational dynamics associated with
network centrality also impact one’s scholarship because the National Research Council’s rankings include (although
not solely focus on) high-quality publications. Thus, there is indirect evidence to support such a notion.
A major dynamic that may explain why ANC should impact publications has to do with the nature of high-quality journals
themselves. Speciﬁcally, publishing in top or high-quality journals involves, among other issues, having original, innovative,
or creative ideas that often come from being exposed to new or unique ideas (Judge et al., 2007), as noted by social network
scholarship, given their ties centrally located units are in the middle of information exchanges from connected units. Such
access to information can lead to the creation or combination of new ideas, in particular for units with more stable or reciprocal
ties to others, giving a strong exposure to a diversity of ideas for a sustained period (Oh, Chung, & Labianca, 2004; Tsai &
Ghoshal, 1998). Such exchanges allow members of a unit to tap into network resources, without necessarily having participated in their creation, and also expose them to new ideas (Kostova & Roth, 2003). In fact, studies (Walter, Lechner, &
Kellermanns, 2007) show that when organizations or units have reciprocal ties, these ties give rise to more opportunities
for information exchanges (Marsden & Friedkin, 1993) and over time foster and facilitate the development of norms related
to such information exchanges, such as joint problem-solving, ﬁne-grained information transfer, and other beneﬁts (Uzzi,
1997).
Consequently, centrally located units and their members can beneﬁt instrumentally by using this new information or
ideas in achieving their goals to improve their outcomes (Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000; Hansen, 2002). For example,
several studies have shown that network centrality positively facilitates the creation of new ideas and positively impacts
innovation (Burton, Sørensen, & Beckman, 2002; Hansen, 2002; Ibarra, 1993). Extending this logic to management
academia, we argue that by virtue of membership in a centrally located unit with a relatively stable pattern of personnel
exchange and their impact on information exchanges, as conduits for communication (Burris, 2004), PhD students by
association are also at the center of more communication and information exchanges between their department and those
connected to it. They are, for instance, more likely to be exposed to more working papers through visiting lectures or
conferences organized in the ﬁeld (Burris, 2004) that can give them insights into cutting-edge ideas before they come into
print. Such exposure, in turn, can foster the creation of new or original ideas (i.e., Burton et al., 2002; Mehra et al., 2006;
Tsai, 2001) that is likely to matter for high-quality publications (i.e., Judge et al., 2007). This dynamic is distinct from
prestige, which may enhance one’s perceived quality but is not based on such social dynamics (Cable & Murray,
1999). This would particularly make a difference in early career publications because the ideas generated during the
graduate program often lead to the ﬁrst set of publications (Miller et al., 2005). Hence, we suggest,
Hypothesis 2: PhDs graduating from more centrally located departments are positively associated with early career
quality publications.

Method
Data and sample
Our sample includes 602 new doctoral graduates in business administration or management, all of whom graduated
between 2005 and 2007 and were hired for their ﬁrst academic positions in 2006, 2007, and 2008. The construction
Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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of this sample involved several steps over a period of several months. First, we closely followed the procedures used by
Miller et al. (2005) and scanned the UMI dissertation abstract service for dissertations published between May 2004 and
September 2007 to collect data on PhD graduates in management science only. UMI was also used to assess information
regarding the graduates’ dissertation chairperson (Miller et al., 2005). Second, following Miller et al., we used the Academy of Management (AOM) online membership archive and Google to determine if these graduates were employed, the
details on their new position, and their CVs (if posted online). Combining our sources of data, we attained a ﬁnal sample
of 602 employed PhD graduates in management science who graduated from 102 PhD-granting institutions in the U.S.

Dependent Variables
New job prestige
The measurement of academic prestige varies by different stakeholders; the academic community assesses prestige at
both the department level (Cable & Murray, 1999) and the university level (Clark, Warren & Au, 2007). Given this
complexity, we decided to include four related, yet distinct, measures of academic prestige. These reﬂect academic
prestige at the department level, the business school level, and the university level to capture different aspects of prestige.
The ﬁrst measure reﬂects department level academic prestige and was based on the methodology of Long et al. (1998),
who conducted factor and cluster analyses on several published ranking systems of management departments. This
systemranked 105 different management departments into three broad categories: high, middle, and low status. We
followed the same approach and conducted a cluster analysis on the relative rankings of management departments on
the basis of the following sources: (i) the ﬁnal list generated by Long et al. (1998, p. 707); (ii) Business Week’s ranking
of graduate programs at U.S. business schools as of 2004; (iii) U.S. News & World Report’s ranking of U.S. graduate
business schools as of 2004; and (iv) The Financial Times’ ranking of U.S. gradate business schools as of 2004.
Whereas Long et al. (1998) had three categories of status differentiation, we decided to include four (high, middle,
low, and very low status) to increase status variance.
The second was the departmental rankings of management departments as compiled by Gourman (1997). This measure
has been used consistently in studies examining job offer prestige for management PhDs (Cable & Murray, 1999; Miller
et al., 2005; also Judge et al., 2004) and is considered a robust measure of the quality of management departments (Judge
et al., 2004). Although it has been criticized (Bedeian, 2002), it has also been independently validated (Cable & Murray,
1999). Of all management departments, the report identiﬁes 25 management departments as the top departments in the
ﬁeld. As our sample includes 102 different doctoral-granting departments, we dichotomized this measure.
The third measure of new academic job prestige reﬂects the resources available to new faculty members, which
was assessed on the basis of the budget per faculty in business schools. The Association to Advance Collegiate
Schools of Business (AACSB) provides us with a proxy for such resources, as each member school lists their budget
per faculty at their business school. This budget is the average school allocation for faculty members, which is
highly variable across schools. This measure applies only to business schools that are AACSB accredited. A large
majority of our sample (71 per cent) was AACSB accredited; the rest (29 per cent) were not accredited.
The fourth measure utilized to assess job prestige was the university-wide Carnegie Classiﬁcation of Institutional
Characteristics. The Carnegie Classiﬁcation system provides in-depth descriptions of higher education institutions in the
U.S. on the basis of differentiating between the focus and the research activity of these institutions. This classiﬁcation,
amended in 2005, includes several categories—ranging from institutions that offer only associates’ degrees and do not
have research activity, to institutions that provide a bachelors’ degree, to master’s degree and doctoral-granting institutions.
Several studies have used this approach (Barbezat & Hughes, 2001; Hahn et al., 2007), and it is considered a powerful
classiﬁcation system with regard to the research orientation of higher education institutions. We coded this scheme on
the basis of the level of education provided by the focal university: associate’s degree-granting institutions were the ﬁrst
Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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level, followed by bachelor’s degree-granting institutions, master’s degree-granting institutions, and doctoral degreegranting institutions (which also include three levels: research, high research, and very high research).

Early career high-quality publications
We measured early career high-quality publications on the basis of Thomson Reuters ISI impact factors for
business and management journals, based on graduates’ publications between their hiring dates and May
2011. For most graduates, this reﬂects a period of between 3.5 and 4 years after obtaining a new job. We chose
this window given that if a faculty member is awarded tenure, it is typically within six to seven years of obtaining new employment; our measurement also reﬂects the deﬁnition of early career utilized by other research on
career outcomes (i.e., Bedeian et al., 2010). Journal impact factors are an important indication of the scientiﬁc
importance and relevance of journals (Ireland, 2009). Other studies have relied on this measure to assess quality
of publications (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992; Long et al., 1998). To ensure that we capture more inﬂuential
journals, we included only those publications that have an impact factor at or above the median for business
and management journals.

Independent Variables
PhD-granting departments’ network centrality
Our approach to the measurement of ANC closely follows Burris’ (2004) methodology. Burris does so by looking at
the cumulative exchange networks of PhD hires from one department to the other (and vice versa) for the universe of
doctoral-granting departments in a speciﬁc discipline. Methodologically, the network centrality of department i
(SCi) is given by the following formula:
SCi ¼ ai 1c1 þ ai 2c2 þ ai 3c3 þ ai 4c4 þ . . . þ ain cn ¼ Σaij cj
where aij represents the ties department i has with department j, cj is the social capital possessed by department j, and
aii is set to zero (because ties to oneself do not capture social capital; Burris, 2004, p. 251). Thus, we are presented
with a set of n simultaneous equations for each of the doctoral-granting departments in our sample of job seekers.
Given the number of possible reciprocal ties between one department and another, we potentially face a problem
of inﬁnite convergence. Yet, Burris notes that a well-designed solution exists to this problem, as given by the
Bonacich’s (1987) eigenvalue centrality measure. The eigenvalue centrality measure captures the adjacency matrix
Aij, representing ties among all departments i and j. Here, the centrality of department i, ci is notated by aΣAijcj, in
which a is the reciprocal of the largest eigenvalue and c1 to cn represent the centralities of the corresponding
eigenvector (Burris, 2004, pp. 251–252). We used this approach on our sample of PhD-granting departments in
management. On the basis of our sample, we ﬁrst identiﬁed all PhD-granting departments, 102 in total. We then
calculated the Bonacich eigenvalue centrality measure for the cumulative PhD exchange networks among all the
departments representing all cumulative faculty hires in management or management-related ﬁelds as of and up
to 2004, 2005, and 2006. With each department included, this resulted in a matrix of approximately 1000 individual
faculty members. We utilized UCINET 6 (Analytic Technologies, Lexington, KY 40513, USA) to analyze our matrix and to obtain the Bonacich centrality measure for each management department.
Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Control Variables
Annual effects
Given the different graduation years in our sample, we included a year dummy to account for possible annual effects.

Job seekers’ gender
Following Judge et al. (2004), we included job seekers’ gender. This was measured via self-reported information and
gathered from either job seekers’ faculty websites or CVs.

Universalistic Criteria Controls
Job seekers’ academic credentials
On the basis of previous research, we looked at the number of high-quality publications published ﬁve years prior to
obtaining the new job (Bedeian et al., 2010), based on the journal impact factor in the Thomson ISI citation service
(above the median impact factor score for management and business administration journals).

PhD teaching-related experience
Given the possible impact of teaching experience on getting a new job (Stock & Alston, 2000), we added a dichotomous
measure for teaching experience. For each doctoral graduate, we examined information available on their websites or
veriﬁed if their PhD program requires doctoral students to engage in teaching responsibilities.

Conference presentations
We scanned the AOM conference programs and similar publications for the AOM’s annual conference ﬁve years prior
to the graduation date of each doctoral graduate to determine the number of AOM-related conference presentations.

Particularistic Criteria Controls
Job seekers’ academic prestige
We used two complementary measures to assess the prestige of one’s PhD-granting department. First, we applied the
aforementioned cluster analysis conducted on business schools and management departments and used the relevant
rankings applied to graduates’ PhD programs (based on four categories ranging from high status to very low status).
Further, to ensure that our measure of prestige was not duplicated, we regressed the Bonacich centrality measure
(discussed earlier) on this measure and used the residuals in our analyses. Second, we also used the Carnegie
Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Classiﬁcation distinctions among the three types of doctoral-granting institutions. Third, we counted the number of
graduates’ publications with their dissertation chair.

Dissertation chairperson’s academic credentials
We determined this by utilizing three measures. First, we looked at the number of high-quality publications ranked at, or
above, the median impact factor of the Thomson ISI impact factor scale for management and business administration
journals. Second, we included a measure of academic visibility (a proxy for reputation). To do so, we counted the
number of times the dissertation chair’s articles were cited using both ProQuest/Abinform and Google scholar for
articles published up till the graduation date of the job seeker. Third, we looked at the business journal media visibility
of the dissertation chairperson by analyzing references to or his or her or citations in general media outlets and
magazines such as Fortune, Financial Times, Wall Street Journal, or Business Week.

Analyses
We utilized ordinary least squares regressions for the measures of departmental prestige on the basis of the Long
et al. (1998) approach, the Carnegie Classiﬁcation, budget per faculty, and number of high-quality publications.
We used logistic regression for the second measure of departmental prestige (based on the Gourman report) as it
is a dichotomous variable.
In all our regressions, we used a two-step procedure. Step 1 included our demographic controls, universalistic controls,
and particularistic controls. Step 2 included network centrality (the Bonacich eignevalue centrality measure).

Results
Table 1 provides the means, standard deviations, and correlations among the variables. With regard to some of the
variable, we see that 60 per cent of job seekers are men, that approximately 74 per cent of doctoral graduates have
some teaching experience, and that (on average) each of them has had 1.31 AOM (national and regional) conference
presentations. Table 2 provides our regression analyses.
Hypothesis 1 posited a positive association between the department’s ANC for a PhD graduate and his or her
obtaining an academic job with higher departmental prestige. This hypothesis was supported for the ﬁrst measure
of departmental prestige (b = .47, p < .0001, Model 1, Step 2), for the second measure of departmental prestige
(b = 6.39, p < . 0001, Model 2, Step 2), for the AACSB measure of budget per faculty (b = .36, p < .0001, Model
3, Step 2) and for the Carnegie Classiﬁcation measure of institutional prestige (b = .23, p < .0001, Model 4, Step
2). Overall, Hypothesis 1 was supported. (The incremental R2 ranged between 3 and 14 per cent.)
Hypothesis 2 posited that PhDs graduating from more centrally located departments will be positively associated
with early career quality publications. This hypothesis was not supported (b = .05, p < .10, Model 5, Step 2). The
incremental R2 was 0 per cent.
With regard to our control variables, the number of high-quality publications at graduation was consistently associated with our different dependent variables, whereas the measure of departmental prestige of graduates’ PhD
departments was partially associated with our different dependent variables.
Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Discussion
This study set out to examine how ANC impacts the career outcomes of new PhD recipients in management. Following
Bourdieu (1986) and other scholars (Burris, 2004), we argue that ANC arises out of a fundamental exchange process in
the form of PhD students’ exchanges, through hiring and placement, over time. Our premise is that students associated
with departments with higher ANC would have greater access to resources—information, visibility—that could impact
their careers in ways different from those who do not have access to a similar source of social capital. In particular, we
investigated if the ANC of a department would result in the department’s ability to place PhD students in prestigious
departments and also if it might impact their early career publications. Overall, our measure of ANC (based on cumulative PhD exchanges in management departments) was a signiﬁcant predictor of four separate measures of academic
prestige measured at both the departmental and institutional levels. ANC explained an additional variance of 3, 6, 6,
and 14 per cent for the dependent variables, when signiﬁcant. However, the study failed to support the notion that
ANC matters when it comes to early career publications. It is interesting to note that the impact of dissertation chair
characteristics (academic and media visibility) was limited to our ﬁrst dependent variable but not to the others. We
believe the impact of this person (training and guidance) may have already been captured via the graduates’ own or
shared publications and via the overall prestige of their department.
Our ﬁndings echo Bourdieu’s (1986) assertion that central locations of organizations within a network are not only reﬂective of status distinctions, acquired through their position, but may also provide unit members with unique relational
beneﬁts, independent of other criteria. We also ﬁnd that merit-based achievements (such as high-quality publications) also
matter, but less so than network centrality. Paradoxically, whereas the beneﬁts of ANC matter for getting new jobs in
prestigious departments, it seems they matter much less for getting quality early career publications. Thus, it appears that
graduates from such departments are more attractive hires than those who originate from departments with lower network
centrality, regardless of the lack of association of ANC on scholarship outcomes. This counterintuitive ﬁnding, despite a
strong pattern indicating a heavy reliance on ANC for hiring, can be indicative of three dynamics: (i) that hiring departments have a perceptual bias for preferring hires from departments with higher network centrality that reﬂect visibility
or exclusivity. Encountered by uncertainty in the environment, they rely on ANC as a heuristic or a shortcut as we see
in the case of other hiring contexts (Williamson & Cable, 2003a); (ii) departments continue to hire within their networks
despite the fact that it may not always necessarily result in high-quality publications of the new hires. This could be because
they may have a need to maintain the position within the social network and for other kinds of possible social beneﬁts that
can be gained from strong connections, which emerge from such hiring patterns; and (iii) given that management is a ﬁeld
with a developing paradigm, characterized by low consensus on important research questions and methodology (Pfeffer,
1993), it is less surprising that ANC may not be sufﬁcient to impact one’s publications, given lower consensus and
associated scholarship uncertainty. On the one hand, if this is the case, some graduates with high scholarly potential
may miss out. These graduates may not come from departments with high ANC but may nonetheless have good potential
for high-quality publications, which may not have been maximized in departments with lesser resources. Moreover, highstatus departments may hire graduates who eventually do not publish as expected and, consequently, do not get tenure,
thereby increasing turnover costs for the department. Thus, there can be different kinds of costs associated with hiring at
least partly based on ANC. On the other hand, looking at the amount of variance explained in our study, we see that, at
best, ANC explains an additional 14 per cent in occupational outcomes but as little as 3 per cent, so the impact of ANC
and its dynamics is qualiﬁed.
As noted earlier, developing paradigmatic ﬁelds tend to rely more on particularistic criteria (such as social capital)
than universalistic ones (Long & Fox, 1995) when compared with more developed ﬁelds. Given the paradigmatic
weakness of management science (Ferris, Ketchen & Buckley, 2008), it would seem that management academia
would probably exhibit this over-reliance on particularistic criteria. However, when viewed in comparison with
some other ﬁelds, management science does not seem as extreme. Our ﬁndings, thus, provide indirect support for
the argument that management science is a ﬁeld whose paradigm is still developing but mature enough to not have
excessive reliance on particularistic criteria for hiring.
Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

J. Organiz. Behav. 33, 723–739 (2012)
DOI: 10.1002/job

736

M. HADANI ET AL.

Limitations
One of our limitations is that we measured only one kind of network of a department, that is, the hiring network.
Although scholars have argued (Burris, 2004) that the essential basis of ANC comes from the exchange of students,
there can be other forms of academic networks too such as editorial networks (formed through having editors who
are connected to a community of reviewers) or publication networks (formed through the coauthors networks scholars
have). Another limitation is that we did not look at how individuals utilize the social resources associated with network
centrality. For instance, do they gain access to inﬂuential others such as editors or prominent scholars? Do they gain
access to unique datasets? We also did not examine possible moderation effects of social networks on the value of
merit-based criteria (e.g., see Bedeian et al., 2010). Such an analysis can expose the boundary conditions under which
ANC matters more or less.

Future research and conclusion
In this study, we attempt to contribute to a better understanding of how network centrality of PhD-granting departments
impacts initial job placement and future research outcomes of graduates, as part of a larger exploration of the sociology
of hiring in management academia. We also consider the impact of both particularistic and universalistic criteria on the
eventual decision to hire these graduates and extend previous research by examining how these criteria and network
centrality impact early career scholarship. There are several research questions that one can explore in the future on
the basis of this paper. First, studies can examine how individuals use the social resources embedded within their
centrally located departments to achieve occupational outcomes in academia; opening the “black box” of social network
capital may be warranted, by use of surveys. Second, studies can look at psychological outcomes of new hires in terms
of social ﬁt and adjustment on the basis of the characteristics of their PhD origin and those of the hiring institutions, to
explore the notion of prestige or status ﬁt on the basis of network centrality. Third, although we do ﬁnd that there is a
notion of social closure (Burris, 2004) that is implied in the positive relationship between ANC and new job prestige,
we did not test it. Social closure reﬂects the preference for maintaining a highly selective unit on the basis of social
or ascriptive criteria that can signal prestige (Bourdieu, 1986). This could potentially be an avenue for future research,
for example, by use of interviews.
To summarize, at best, we see a mixed picture regarding hiring norms for management departments. Although academic
departments do appear to consider the achievements of doctoral graduates, they also rely on departmental network centrality and other particularistic criteria when making hiring decisions. Our ﬁndings also indicate that although network centrality matters for hiring institutions, it does not explain future publications. This is a very important ﬁnding in the ﬁeld of
management because it uncovers a trend of hiring in management academia that is not actively recognized. Moreover,
the results of this study should be something that departments should consider when thinking about the placement of their
graduate students. It is also important for hiring departments to understand and make decisions on what would be some of
the best criteria for them to hire. From a normative viewpoint, in the terms used by Merton (1942), the ﬁeld of management
does not seem to clearly follow universalistic norms; it may well use a hybrid norm—combining universalistic and
particularistic considerations.
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